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TRUST AND SUSPICION HAVE LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED AS 
ESSENTIAL BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS IN THE BARGAINING SITU-
ATION. HOWEVER, FEW THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTALLY DERIVED 
DESCRIPTIONS OF THESE VARIABLES HAVE BEEN OFFERED. INABILITY 
ON THE PART OF THE EXPERIMENTER TO SET UP OPERATIONALLY DEFIN-
ABLE CONTROLS HAS FOR THE MOST PART BEEN THE LIMITING FACTOR. 
DEUTSCH (195$) INITATED A RESEARCH PROGRAM IN WHICH HE 
EMPLOYED THE NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE MATHEMATICALLY DERIVED GAME 
(SEE APENDIX 2) AS A MEANS TO CONTROL CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE 
CONCEPTS OF TRUST AND SUSPICION WERE ESSENTIAL IN AN INTER-
ACTION BETWEEN TWO PLAYERS. THROUGH MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION 
ONE PARTICIPANT IN THE GAME DISPLAYED BEHAVIOR COMMENSURATE 
TO THE TYPE OF ORIENTATION PRESENTED TO HIM PRIOR TO PARTICI-
PATION IN THE GAME. IN THE SAME ST UD Y, DEUTSCH (1958 P. 266) 
OFFERED THE DEFINITION OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST AS: 
A PERSON MAY BE SAID TO HAVE TRUST IN THE OCCURRENCE 
OF AN EVENT, IF HE EXPECTS ITS OCCURRENCE AND HIS EXPEC-
TATION LEADS TO BEHAVIOR THAT HE PERCEIVES TO HAVE POSITIVE 
MOTIVATIONAL CONSEQUENCES IF THE EXPECTATION IS CONFIRMED 
AND NEGATIVE MOTIVATIONAL CONSEQUENCES IF IT IS NOT. HE 
MAY BE S~ID TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF AN EVENT 
IF THE DISCONFIRMATION OF THE EXPECTATION OF THE EVENT'S 
OCCURRENCE IS PREFERRED TO ITS CONFIRMATION, AND IF THE 
EXPECTATION OF ITS OCCURRENCE LEADS TO BEHAVIOR THAT IS 
IN T ENDED TO REDUCE ITS NEGATIVE MOTIVATIONAL CONSEQUENCES. 
TRUST AND SUSPICION THEN SUGGEST UTILIZATION OF A CON-
CEPTUAL PROCESS IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL MUST NOT ONLY FORMULATE 
HIS OWN EXPECTATIONS OF THE OTHER 1 S PERFORMANCE, BUT MUST ALSO 
MAKE AN EVALUATIVE JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE OTHER PERSON'S CON-
CEPTUALIZATION OF HIS OWN BEHAVIOR. SCHELLING (1958 P. 209) 
PROPOSES THAT! 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROCESS OF CO-ORDINATION IS NOT SHEER 
GUESSWORK OF WHAT ANOTHER WILL DO. REASONING BECOMES DIS-
CONNECTED FROM THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION. ONE IS NOT, IN 
TACIT CO-ORDINATION, TRYING TO GUESS WHAT THE OTHER WILL 
DO IN AN OBJECTIVE SITUATION! ONE IS TRYING TO GUESS WHAT 
THE OTHER WILL GUESS ONE 1 S SELF TO GUESS THE OTHER TO GUESS, 
AND SO ON INFINITUM. 
IN THE SAME STUDY, SCHELLING (1958 P. 257) OFFERS: 
IN THE MIXED MOTIVE GAME, TWO OR MORE CENTERS OF CON-
SCIOUSNESS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE OTHER IN AN ESSENTIAL WAY. 
SOMETHING HAS TO BE COMMUNICATED; AT LEAST SOME SPARK OF 
RECOGNITION MUST PASS BETWEEN THE PLAYERS. THERE IS GENER-
ALLY A NECESSITY FOR SOME SOCIAL ACTIVITY, HOWEVER RUDIMEN-
TARY AND TACIT IT MAY BE; AND BOTH PLAYERS ARE DEPENDENT 
TO SOME DEGREE ON THE SUCCESS OF THEIR SOCIAL INTERACTION 
AND PERCEPTION. EVEN TWO COMPLETELY ISOLATED INDIVIDUALS, 
WHO PLAY WITH EACH OTHER IN COMPLETE SILENCE AND WITHOUT 
EVEN KNOWING EACH OTHER 1 S IDENTITY, MUST TACITLY REACH 
SOME MEETING OF THE MINDS. 
MINAS ET AL. (1960) UTILIZED NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAMES TO STUDY 
PERFORMANCE OF INDIVIDUALS WHERE THE INCENTIVE TO cooeERATE 
RATHER THAN COMPETE WAS ENHANCED BY LARGER PAYOFFS FOR COOPER-
ATIVE BEHAVIOR. IN SPITE OF THIS ENTICEMENT, THE SUBJECTS 
AVOIDED COOPERATIVE STRATEGY. THE AUTHORS SUGGESTED THAT 
COMPETITIVENESS MAY BE A PREDICTABLE VARIABLE ESPECIALLY IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH EGO-INVOLVEMENT. 
IF COOPERATION OR COMPETITIVENESS ARE CRUCIAL CON-
CEPTUAL INGREDIENTS IN THE MORE COMPLEX BEHAVIOR CALLED TRUST 
OR SUSPICION, THEN THE PROPOSITION SUGGESTS THAT DEVELOPMENTAL 
FACETS OF EGO INTEGRATION MIGHT WELL CONSTITUTE BEHAVIORAL 
PATTERNS DISPLAYED BY AN INDIVIDUAL IN A BARGAINING SITUATION. 
IT IS BY THE SECONDARY PROCESS IN FREUD 1 S CONCEPT OF 
EGO FUNCTIONS THAT THE EGO FORMULATES A PLAN FOR THE SATIS-
FACTION OF THE NEED AND THEN TESTS THIS PLAN, USUALLY BY SOME 
KIND OF ACTION, IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL WORK. 
IN ORDER TO PERFORM ITS ROLE EFFICIENTLY THE EGO HAS CONTROL 
OVER ALL THE COGNITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONS. THESE 
HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES ARE PLACED AT THE SERVICE OF THE 
SECONDARY PROCESS. THE EGO IS SAID TO BE THE EXECUTIVE OF THE 
PERSONALITY BECAUSE IT CONTROLS THE GATEWAYS TO ACTION, SELECTS 
THE FEATURES OF THE ENVIR ONMENT TO WHICH I T WILL RESPOND, AND 
DECIDES WHAT INSTINCTS WILL BE SATISFIED AND IN WHAT MANNER. 
(HALL AND LINDZEY 1961). 
IN AN ELABORATION OF HIS EARLIER DEFINITIONS OF TRUST 
AND SUSPICION, DEUTSCH (1960) CONSIDERS THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES 
OF A SITUATION CONFRONTING THE INDIVIDUAL WITH A CHOICE TO 
TRUST OR NOT IN THE BEHAVIOR OF ANOTHER PERSON THROUGH A 
REALIZATION AS TO WHETHER THE PERCEIVED EVENT WILL LEAD TO A 
BENEFICIAL OR HARMFUL OUTCOME. IN N ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE 
MINIMAL SOCIAL OR SITUATIONAL CONDITIONS UNDER WH ICH MUTUAL 
TRUST COULD ARISE IN DYADS WITH AN INDIVIDUALISTIC ORIENTA-
TION, SOLOMAN (1960) CITES DEUTSCH'S FORMULATIONS ALONG WITH 
HEIDER 1 S PRINCIPLE OF COGNITIVE BALANCE TO PROVIDE A THEO-
RETICAL BASIS FOR SEVERAL HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF 
POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN BEHAVIORAL GAME STRATEGY. 
A RECENT STUDY HAS SHOWN HIGH CORRELATION BETWEEN SCORES 
ON THE F SCALE AND TRUSTWORTHY AND SUSPICIOUS B~HAVIOR. 
(DEUTSCH 1960). IN SURVEYING THE RESULTS, THE AUTHOR PRO-
POSES THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN THE F SCALE SCORES DOES NOT 
NECESSARILY REFLECT STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY SO 
MUCH AS CONTENT DIFFERENCES IN THE VALUES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL 
HAS INTERNALIZED IN A DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIZATION SPECIFIC TO 
HIS OWN SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. RATHER THEN POSITING THAT THE 
ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF EITHER TRUSTING OR SUSPICIOUS PEOPLE IS 
OF STRUCTURAL IMPORTANCE, WHERE THE SUPEREGO IS INCOMPLETELY 
INTEGRATED WITH THE EGO OR SELF, DEUTSCH RATHER PROPOSES THAT 
THE CONTENT DIFFERENCES DEPENDENT UPON THE INDIVIDUAL 1 S RE-
ACTION TO INTERNALIZED SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES ARE THE 
DETERMINING FACTORS. HE CONCLUDES: 
PRESUMABLY, THE PATHOLOGIES OF TRUST AND SUSPICION BOTH 
REFLECT INTERNAL CONFLICT AND EGO WEAKNESS, BOTH OF WHICH 
MAY BE FOUND IN INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE INTERNALIZED WIDELY 
DIFFERING VALUES. 
WITH THE PERCEIVED MAXIMUM BENEFICIAL END IN SIGHT, 
THE METHOD OF SELECTION OF BEHAVIOR TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL 
APPEARS TO BE THE PERTINENT FUNCTION OF DETERMINATE BEHAVIOR 
IN THE BARGAINING SITUATION. INTERNALIZED CULTURAL, SOCIAL 
AND MORAL VALUES WITHIN THE EGO STRUCTURE APPEAR TO BE THE 
CRUCIAL DETERMINANTS FOR A MODE OF BEHAVIOR, WHETHER TO TRUST 
OR NOT TO TRUST, OR WHETHER TO SUSPECT OR NOT TO SUSPECT THE 
BEHAVIOR OF ANOTHER IN A BARGAINING SITUATION. 
SEVERAL STUDIES HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECTS OF 
COMMUNICATION UPON THE COOPERATIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
THE NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAME. THE RESULTS TEND TO INDICATE THAT 
WHERE COMMUNICATION IS ALLOWED BETWEEN PLAYERS THERE IS A 
GREATER TENDENCY TO MAKE COOPERATIVE CHOICES (DEUTSCH 1953, 
LOOMIS 1959). SCHELLING, HOWEVER, CONTENDS THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT 11 RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 11 IN THE GAME 
WHERE FULL COMMUNICATION IS ALLOWED BETWEEN THE PLAYERS IS 
ALMOST ANALOGOUS WITH THE INTELLECTUAL PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT 
A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY IN THE TACIT GA ME WHERE NO COM MUNI-
CATION IS ALLOWED. 
MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION PRIOR TO GA ME PARTICIPATION 
SUGGESTS PREDICTIVE GAME BEHAVIOR. (DEUTSCH 1958 , 1960). 
RESULTS BY WILLIS & JOSEPH (1959) TEND TO CORROBORATE THOSE 
OF DEUTSCH, WHERE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS WERE INTRODUCED TO 
ORIENTATE THE SUBJECT TO INDUCE A SPIRIT OF COOPERATIVENESS, 
INDIVIDUALITY, OR COMPETITIVENESS. IN EMPLOYING SOMEWHAT 
DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS TO INDUCE ORIENTATION, 
PEDERSON (1961) FOUND NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
TYPE OF ROLE PLAY ORIENTATION BY THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS 
BEHAVIOR IN THE ACTUAL GA ME SITUATION. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLE M 
THE NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAME HAS BEEN UTILIZED TO STUDY 
BEHAVIOR OF AN INDIVIDUAL IN A BARGAINING SITUATION UNDER 
VARIOUS EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS. THEORETICAL NOTIONS HA VE 
BEEN OFFERED CONCERNING THE CHOICE OF TRUST OR SUSPICIO N BY 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN THESE GAMES AND THE UNDERLYING CONCE P TUAL 
PROCESSES INVOLVED IN SUCH DECISIONS. FoR THE MOST PART THESE 
NOTIONS HAVE SUGGESTED CONTENT DIFFERENCES IN VALUES INCOR-
PORATED BY THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE EGO-PROCESS. SUCH CO N-
CLUSIONS THEN LEAD TO THE QUESTION THAT IF SUCH STRUCTURAL 
DIFFERENCES ARE INVOLVED IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS, THEN 
CANNOT THE OBSERVED BEHAVIOR OF AN INDIVIDUAL IN SUCH A 
BARGAINING SITUATION SERVE AS A PREDICTOR OF THE VALUE SYSTEM 
THAT THAT PERSON HAS INCORPORATED WITHIN HIS OWN EGO-PROCESS? 
IT HAS LONG BEEN ACCEPTED THAT MAL-ADJUSTIVE EGO-
FUNCTIONING IS NOTABLE IN VARIOUS TYPES OF MENTAL DISORDERS. 
IN SUMMARIZING THE WIDE RANGE OF SYMPTOMS WHICH ANTI-SOCIAL 
PERSONALITIES DISPLAY, COLEMAN (1956 P. 33$) CITES AMONG 
0TH ERS: 




INABILITY ON THE PART OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO UNDER-
STAND AND ACCEPT ETHICAL VALUES, EXCEPT ON THE 
VERBAL LEVEL, OR PURSUE SOCIALLY ACCEPTED GOALS. 
EGOCENTRIC IMPULSIVENESS, IRRESPONSIBILITY, LACK 
OF RESTRAINT, AND POOR JUDGMENT. A CALLOUS DIS-
REGARD FOR THE NEEDS AND RIGHTS OF OTHERS. 
INABILITY TO FOREGO IMMEDIATE PLEASURES FOR FUTURE 
GAINS AND LONG-RANGE GOALS. EXTERNAL REALITIES 
USED FOR IMMEDIATE PERSONAL GRATIFICATION. 
DEFECTIVE INTERPERSONAL AND GENERAL SOCIAL RELATION-
SHIPS. THE INDIVIDUAL USUALLY IS CYNICAL, UNSYM-
PATHETIC, UNGRATEFUL ANO REMORSELESS IN HIS DEAL-
INGS WITH OTHERS. USUALLY SHOWS HISTORY OF DIFFI-
CULTIES WITH EDUCATIONA AND/OR LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITIES. No CLOSE FR IENDS. 
THE MAL-ADAPTIVE EGO-PROCESS USUALLY FOUND IN THE SOCIO-
PATHIC PERSONALITY WOULD INDICATE DIVERGENT BEHAVIOR IN TACIT 
BARGAINING. 
THE PROPOSITION IS FORWARDED THAT AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS 
BEEN RECOGNIZED BY HIS COLLEAGUES AND HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED BY 
THEM WITH AUTHORITY TO ACT IN THEIR BEHALF AND BENEFIT SHOULD 
DISPLAY BEHAVIOR IN THE BARGAINING SITUATION WHICH WOULD TEND 
TO SUBSERVIATE IMMEDIATE PERSONAL GAIN FOR THE MORE MUTUALLY 
DESIRED END GAIN. 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER WAS TO DEVISE EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS TO TEST THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHESES: 
1 ). IN A BARGAINING SITUATION UTILIZING THE NON-ZERO-
SUM TYPE GAME, THE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS BEEN DIAG-
NOSED AS FUNCTIONING WITH A SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 
WILL DISPLAY BEHAVIOR INDICATING SIGNIFICANTLY MORE 
COMPETITIVE CHOICES THEN lHE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS NO 
HISTORY OF MAL-ADJUSTED BEHAVIOR. 
2). THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IS CONSIDERED A LEADER BY HIS 
POSITION, WHETHER BY APPOINTMENT OR ELECTION, WITH 
AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT AND NEGOTIATE FOR HIS COL-
LEA GUES, WILL DISPLAY BEHAVIOR DENOTING MORE COOPER-
ATIVE CHOICES THEN AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IS NOT CON-
SIDERED A LEADER IN THE MEANING GIVEN ABOVE, IN THE 
BARGAINING SITUATION. 
Ir rs FURTHER PROPOSED IN CONSIDERING THE SYMPTO MS 
USUALLY FOUND IN THE SocroPATHIC PERSONALITY, THAT THE Socio-
PATH WILL DISPLAY MORE SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR THEN THE PERSON 
WITH NO HISTORY OF MAL-ADJUSTED BEHAVIOR. WITH IMPAIRED 
JUDGMENT AND A CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR THE NEEDS AND RIGHTS OF 
OTHERS ALONG WITH THE INABILITY TO FOREGO IMMEDIATE PLEASURES 
FOR FUTURE GAINS, THE SoclOPATH WILL BE LESS TRUSTING OF HIS 
OPPONENT IN THE BARGAINING SITUATION. FUNCTIONING WITH DEFEC-
TIVE INTERPERSONAL AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, HE WILL BE SUS-
PICIOUS OF THE MOTIVES AND MOVES OF THE OTHER MEMBER OF THE DYAD. 
IN ADDITION TO TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS GIVEN, EXPERI-
MENTAL CONDITIONS WILL BE INTRODUCED TO INFLUENCE THE SUBJECT TO 
CONSIDER THE 0 0SSIBILITIES OF RETALIATION BY THE OTHER PLAYER 
AND TO SUGGEST COOPERATIVE PLAY FOR GREATER MUTUAL GAIN. 
CHAPTER 11 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
AN EXPERIMENT WAS DESIGNED THAT UTILIZED THE NON-ZERO-
SUM TYPE GAME IN WHICH A TOTAL OF 48 SUBJECTS PARTICIPATED. 
THREE GROUPS, HEREAFTER CALLED GROUPS A, N, AND L WERE CO M-
PRISED Of 16 SUBJECTS IN EACH GROUP, WITH A FURTHER SUB-
DIVISION OF EACH GROUP INTO TWO SUB-GROUPS. THE SUB-GROUPS 
ARE REFERRED TO AS A1 AND A2 , N1 AND N2 , AND L1 AND L2 • 
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO SUBJECTS IN SUB-GROUPS 
2 2 2 A, N, AND L. ALL Of THE SUBJECTS IN THIS EXPERIMENT ARE 
REFERRED TO AS PLAYER 2a PLAYER 1 WAS A COLLEGE STUDENT WHO 
ACTED AS AN ASSISTANT TO THE EXPERIMENTER AND WHOSE CHOICE OF 
PLAY WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PREDETERMINED PROGRAM. PLAYER 1 
WAS REFERRED TO AS 11 STOOGE 11 • 
BOTH PLAYERS IN THE GAME WERE SEATED AT A TABLE WITH A 
SCREEN BETWEEN THEM LARGE ENOUGH TO CONCEAL THEIR IDENTITY 
FROM ONE ANOTHER. STOOGE WAS EITHER ~ EATED BEFORE THE SUBJECT 
WAS ADMITTED TO THE TESTING ROOM, OR WAS ADMITTED AFTER THE 
SUBJECT WAS SEATED. EVERY ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONCEAL ANY 
CUES AS TO STOOGE'S IDENTITY AND WITH THE EXCEPTION Of SEVERAL 
PROGRAMMED QUESTIONS CONCERNING GAME PROCEDURE, STOOGE DID NOT 
CONVERSE WITH EITHER THE SUBJECT OR EXPERIMENTER. 
GROUP A WAS COMPRISED Of 17 MALE ADULT PATIENTS RANGING 
FROM 20 YEARS TO 42 YEARS OF AGE FROM LARNED STATE HOSPITAL 
WHOSE DIAGNOSED CONDITION WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NOMEN-
CLATURE Of THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL MENTAL Ors-
ORDERS, CODE OOO-x60 TO OOO-x64 INCLUSIVE, UNDER THE GENERAL 
TITLE, SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY DISTURBANCE. (AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 1952 P. 38 ). PARAPHRASING FROM THE 
MANUAL IN A DESCRIPTION OF THIS CATEGORY: 
INDIVIDUALS TO BE PLACED IN THIS CATEGORY ARE ILL 
PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF SOCIETY AND OF CONFORMITY WITH 
THE PREVAILING CULTURAL MILIEU, AND NOT ONLY IN TER MS 
OF PERSONAL DISCOMFORT AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER INDI-
VIDUALS. HOWEVER, SOCIOPATHIC REACTIONS ARE VERY OFTEN 
SYMPTOMATIC OF SEVERE UNDERLYING PERSONALITY DISORDER, 
NEUROSIS, OR PSYCHOSIS, OR OCCUR AS THE RESULT OF ORGA N IC 
BRAIN INJURY OR DISEASE. BEFORE A DEFINITE DIAGNOSIS IN 
THIS GROUP IS EMPLOYED, STRICT ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO 
THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PRESENCE OF A MORE PRIMARY PERSON-
ALITY DISTURBANCE; SUCH UNDERLYING DISTURBANCE WILL BE 
DIAGNOSED WHEN RECOGNIZED. 
ALL OF THE SU BJECTS IN THIS GROuP HAD PREVIOUS RECORDS 
OF ARREST OR INCARCERATION. HOWEVER, NO NE WERE CURRENTLY 
CONFINED FOR VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM ALCOHOLISM OR DRUG 
ADDICTION. TWELVE OF THE SIXTEEN SUBJECTS COMPRISING THIS 
GROUP WERE UNDER SECURITY RESTRICTIONS IN THE CRI MINAL CON-
FINEMENT DIVISION, WHILE THE REMAINING FOUR WERE ON OPEN WARDS. 
THESE SUBJECTS WERE ASKED TO PARTICIP P E IN A GAME IN WHICH 
THEY MIGHT MAKE SOME MONEY AND WERE TOLD THAT THIS EXPERIMENT 
WAS AN INDEPENDENT STUDY BY THE EXPERIMENTER AND WOULD IN NO 
WAY AFFECT THEIR HOSPITAL STATUS. ONE PATIENT INDICATED THAT 
HE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE AND WAS RELEASED FROM THE TESTING ROO M. 
GROUP N WAS COMPRISED OF TEN MALE AND SIX FE MALE COLLEGE 
STUDENTS AT FORT HAYS KANSAS STATE COLLEGE. THIRTEEN OF THESE 
SUBJECTS WERE VOLUNTEER SUBJECTS IN AN INTRODUCTORY PSYCHOLOGY 
COURSE. THE REMAINING THREE WERE VOLUNTEERS WHO WERE WAITING 
FOR CLASSES IN THE VICINITY OF THE TESTING ROOM. 
GROUP L WAS COMPRISED OF TWELVE MALE AND SIX FEMALE 
COLLEGE STUDENTS FROM THE SAME COLLEGE POPULATION AS GROUP N, 
BUT IN ADDITION HELD POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THEIR SOCIAL 
OR ACADE MIC GROUPS. TWELVE OF THESE SUBJECTS WERE EITHER 
FRATERNITY OR SORORITY PRESIDENTS. THE REMAINING FOUR WERE 
CLASS PRESIDENTS OR CAMPUS ORGANIZATION PRESIDENTS. THE DATA 
OBTAINED FROM TWO MALE SUBJECTS WAS DISCARDED AFTER THEY RE-
PORTED TO THE EXPERIMENTER THAT THEY WERE SOPHISTICATED TO THE 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN EMPLOYED. INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE SUB-
JECTS IN THIS GROUP WAS MADE BY TELEPHONE IN WHICH THEY WERE 
ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENT BECAUSE OF THEIR 
POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THEIR PARTICULAR GROUP. 
NON-SIMULTANEOUS CHOICE AND ITERATED TYPE GAME PRO-
CEDURE WAS EMPLOYED. EACH SUBJECT WAS SHO WN A CARD (SEE 
PPENDIX 1) UTILIZING VALUES IN A NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAME MATRIX 
DESCRIBED BY ScoDEL ET AL. (1959). (SEE APPEND IX 2). 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO Sus-GROUPS A1 , N1 AND L1 WERE: 
You ARE GOING TO PARTICIPATE t r A GAME IN WHICH YOU MAY 
KEEP ALL THE MONEY THAT YOU WIN. ANOTHER PERSON ON THE 
OTHER SIDE OF THE SCREEN IS ALSO GOING TO KEEP ALL THE 
MONEY THAT HE WINS. THE GAME IS SIMPLE: IN FRONT OF YOU 
IS A CARD WITH THE COLORS RED AND BLACK. YOUR PART IN THE 
GAME IS TO CHOOSE A COLOR AFTER I SHOW YOU WHAT COLOR THE 
OTHER PLAYER HAS CHOSEN. FoR EXAMPLE, LOOK AT YOUR CARD 
AND THE LARGE BLACK SQUARE HERE. (POINTING) HE HAS CHOSEN 
THE COLOR BLACK, SO IF YOU CHOOSE BLACK YOU BOTH GET THREE 
CENTS. IF YOU CHOOSE RED HOWEVER, WHEN HE HAS CHOSEN BLACK, 
HE GETS NOTHING AND YOU GET FIVE CENTS. Now IF HE CHOOSES 
RED AND YOU CHOOSE BLACK, HE GETS FIVE CENTS AND YOU GET 
NOTHING, BUT IF HE CHOOSES RED AND YOU ALSO CHOOSE RED, YOU 
BOTH GET ONE CENT. PLEASE DO NOT TALK TO THE OTHER PLAYER 
AT ANY TIME OR IN ANY MANNER DISCLOSE THE COLOR YOU CHOOSE 
EXCEPT TO ME AFTER I HAVE POINTED TO THE COLOR HE HAS CHOSEN. 
You CAN INDICATE YOUR CHOICE BY SIMPLY PUTTING YOUR FINGER 
ON THE COLOR CHOICE YOU MAKE . AGAIN , LET ME REMIND YOU THAT 
YOU MAY KEEP ALL THE MONEY THAT YOU WIN. IF YOU HAVE ANY 
QUESTIONS, PLEASE ASK THEM NOW SO THAT YOU ARE CERTAIN 
THAT YOU UNDERSTAND HOW THE GAME WORKS. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO SUB-GROUPS A2 , N2 , AND L2 WERE 
IDENTICAL TO THOSE ABOVE EXCEPT FOR THE ADDITION OF THE 
FOLLOWING PHRASE BEFORE THE FINAL SENTENCE: 
Now TO BE COMPLETELY FAIR IN THIS GAME, AT SOME TIME 
IN THE GAME, I MAY ASK YOU TO CHOOSE FIRST AND I WILL LET 
THE OTHER PLAYER KNOW WHAT COLOR YOU HAVE CHOSEN SO HE 
CAN MAKE HIS CHOICE AFTER HE KNOWS WHAT YOUR 1 S HAS BEEN. 
A COOPERATIVE CHOICE WAS DESIGNATED BY A CHOICE OF 
BLACK BY THE SUBJECT AFTER STOOGE HAD MADE A BLACK CHOICE. 
A NONCOOPERATIVE OR COMPETITIVE CHOICE WAS DESIGNATED WHEN 
THE SUBJECT CHOSE RED AFTER STOOGE HAD MADE A BLACK CHOICE. 
A SERIES OF EIGHT TRIALS OR CHOICES CONSTITUTED A GAME. 
AFTER TRIAL 7, EACH SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT FROM THIS POINT ON 
IN THE GAME, THAT THEY (THE SUBJECT) WOULD NOW CHOOSE FIRST 
AND THE OTHER PLAYER WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE COLOR CHOICE THAT 
THEY HAD MADE. No STATEMENT WAS MADE INDICATING THAT THIS WAS 
THE LAST TRIAL OF THE GAME. THEY WERE INFORMED THAT THE VALUES 
ON THE BLACK-RED COMBINATION AND RED-BLACK COMBINATION WOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
STOOGE'S PATTERN OF CHOICES WAS AS FOLLOWS: ON TRIAL 
HE CHOSE BLACK FOR ALL SUBJECTS, THEREAFTER HIS CHOICE WAS A 
REFLECTION OF THE SUBJECT'S CHOICE IN THE PREVIOUS TRIAL WITH 
ONE EXCEPTION; IF THE SUBJECT CHOSE RED FOLLOWING A RED CHOICE 
BY STOOGE, THEN ON THE NEXT TRIAL STOOGE CHOSE BLACK. OBVIOUSLY, 
IF STOOGE CONTINUED WITH RED CHOICES, THEN THE SUBJECT WOULD 
HAVE LITTLE OR NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CHOOSE RED. 
A SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE WAS GIVEN TO EACH SUBJECT TO 
rill OUT AT THE CONCLUSION Or THE GAME. (SEE APP£ijo1x 3). 
CHAPTER I I I 
RESULTS 
DISTRIBUTION CURVES WERE PLOTTED rOR EACH GROUP IN 
SEVERAL MEASUREMENTS. SINCE NONE Or THESE EVEN CLOSELY 
APPROACHED A NORMAL DISTRIBUTION, NON-PARAMETRIC STATISTICAL 
TECHNIQUES WERE EMPLOYED. (GUILtORD 1956 PP. 228-247). 
THE GRAND MEDIAN Or COOPERATIVE RESPONSES WAS rOUND 
TO BE 2.875. (SEE APPENDIX 2) TABLE 1 LISTS OBTAINED rREQUEN-
CIES IN A 2 X 3 CH1 2 CONTINGENCY TABLE. 
TABLE 1 
OBTAINED rREQUENCIES ABOV E OR BELOW 
MEDIAN Ot COOPERATIVE RESPONSES. 
GROUP 
L N A 
ABOVE 7 13 7 27 
BELOW 9 3 9 21 
16 16 16 48 
THE OBTAINED CH1 2 VALUE IN TABLE EQUALED 6 .092 
WHICH WAS SIGNltlCANT AT THE .05 LEVEL Ot CONtlDENCE. FUR-
THER USE Or CH1 2 TESTS IN COMPARING GRO UP N VS. GROUP A YIELDED 
A CH1 2 VALUE Ot 4. 800. THIS VALUE IS SIGNltlCANT AT THE .05 
2 
LEVEL. AN IDENTICAL VALUE Ot CHI WAS OBTAINED IN COMPARISON 
Ot GROUP L TO GROUP N. IN COMPARISON Or GROUP L TO GROUP A 
A CH1 2 Or O WAS OBTAINED. 
THE MEDIAN NUMBER Or COMPETITIVE RESPONSES WAS rOUNO TO 
BE 3.3. TABLE 2 LISTS THE OBTAINED rREQUENCIES Or COMPETITIVE 
2 
RESPONSES rOR EACH GROUP IN A 2 X 3 CHI CONTINGENCY TABLE. 
TABLE 2 
OBTAINED FREQUENCIES ABOVE OR BELOW 




ABOVE 10 3 






16 16 16 48 
THE OBTAINED CHt 2 VALUE IN TABLE 2 YIELDED A VALUE 
OF 7.224 WHICH WAS SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. 
SUBSEQUENT CH1 2 TESTS WERE MADE AND IN COMPARISON OF GROUP N 
TO GROUP A A VALUE OF 4.800 WAS OBTAINED WHICH WAS SIGNIFICANT 
AT THE .05 LEVEL. GROUP L WHEN COMPARED TO GROUP N RESULTED 
IN A CH1 2 VALUE OF 6.348 AND WAS SIGNIFICANT AT THE .02 LEVEL 
OF CONFIDENCE • IN COMPARING GROUP L TO GROUP A A CH1 2 OF 
• 1294 WAS OBTAINED WHICH IS NOT SIGNIFICANT. 
ON TRIAL 8 (LAST) IN EACH GAME, THE SUBJECT WAS 
INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HIS CHOICE FIRST AND THE OTHER PLAYER WOULD 
BE INFORMED AS TO THE COLOR THAT THE SUBJECT CHOSE. foR THE 
SUBJECT, TRIAL 8 THEN OFFERED TWO ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSE BLACK 
WITH THE HOPE THAT THE OTHER PLAYER (ST OOGE) WOULD ALSO CHOOSE 
BLACK, (WITH MAXIMUM RETURN TO BOTH- A TRUSTING CHOICE) OR 
CHOOSE RED IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS OWN INTERESTS (To MINIMIZE 
LOSS TO THE SUBJECT ONLY- A NON-TRUSTING CHOICE). IN ANY CASE, 
SHOULD THE OTHER PLAYER CHOOSE EITHER BLACK OR RED, THE SUBJECT 
WOULD BE ASSURED OF A RETURN. TABLE 3 LISTS CHOICES BY GROUPS 
FOR TRUSTING AND NON-TRUSTING CHOICES. 
TABLE 3 
No. OF TRUSTING AND NON-TRUSTING 
CHOICES BY GROUPS IN TRIAL 8 . 
GROUPS 
L N A 
TRUSTING 9 13 6 28 
NON -TRUSTING 7 3 10 20 
16 16 16 48 
AN ANALYSIS USING CH1 2 TO THE ABOVE OBTAINED FREQUEN-
CIES YIELDED A VALUE OF 6.333 WHICH WAS SIGNIFICANT BEYOND 
THE .05 LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. IN COMPARING GROUP N TO GROUP 
A, A CH1 2 VALUE OF 6.348 WAS OBTAINED WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT AT 
THE .02 LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. A COMPARISON OF GROUP L VS. 
GROUP N YIELDED A CH1 2 VALUE OF 2.328 AND A COMPARISON OF 
GROUP L VS. GROUP A YIELDED A CH1 2 VALUE OF 1.128, NEITHER 
OF WH ICH WERE SIGNIFICANT. 
THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO Sus-GROUPS TWO, 
IN WHICH THE SUBJECT WAS INFORMED BEFORE THE GAME BEGAN THAT 
AT SOME TIME DURING THE GAME THE OTHER PLAYER WOULD CHOOSE 
FIRST, DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER GAME BEHAVIOR. TABLES 
4 AND 5 LIST OBTAINED FREQUENCIES FOR EACH Sus-GROUP ABOVE 
OR BELOW NUMBER OF MEDIAN RESPONSES FOR COOPERATIVE AND 
COMPETITIVE CHOICES. 
TABLE 4 
COOPERATIVE CHOICES ABOVE 
OR BELOW MED I AN BY Sue-GROUPS 
ABOVE 
BELOW 











COMPETITIVE CHOICES ABOVE 














THE OBTAINED CH1 2 VALUE FOR COMPETITIVE CHOICES IN 
COMPARISON OF Sue-GROUP 1 TO Sue-GROUP 2 WAS 1.370. THE 
CH1 2 VALUE IN COMPARING Sus-GROUP 1 vs. Sue-GROUP 2 FOR 
COOPERATIVE RESPONSES WAS 1.372. NEITHER OF THE ABOVE VALUES 
APPROACHED SIGNIFICANCE. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE YIELDED 
THE OBTAINED FREQUENCIES SHOWN IN TABLE 6, 7, AND 8. 
TABLE 6 
EXPRESSION Or TRUST OR NON-TRUST Or 
OPPONENT AT BEGINNING Or GAME. 
GROUP 
L N A 
TRUSTING 9 9 13 31 
NON-TRUSTING 7 7 3 17 
16 16 16 4S 
THE OBTAINED CH1 2 VALUE rROM THE rREQUENCY DATA rOUND 
IN TABLE 6 WAS 2.907 WHICH WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT. 
TABLE 7 
EXPRESSION Or TRUST OR NON-TRUST Or 
OPPONENT AT END Or GAME. 
GROUP 
L N A 
TRUSTING 11 13 12 36 
NON-TRUSTING 5 3 4 1? 
16 16 16 43 
ANALYSIS Or THE DATA GIVEN IN TABLE 7 OBTAINED A CH1 2 
VALUE OF .666 AND AS WITH QUESTION 1 ABOVE, THERE WAS NO 
SIGNlrlCANT DlrrERENCE BETWEEN GROUPS CONCERNING VERBAL 
EXPRESSION Or TRUST OR NON-TRUST AT THE END Or THE GAME. 
TABLE 3 CONTAINS rREQUENCY DATA CONCERNING QUESTION 3 
Or THE QUESTIONNA IRE WHICH ASKED THE SUBJECT TO EXPRESS VARIOUS 
rEELINGS Or TRUST IN GENERAL. THE DATA INCLUDES rREQUENCY Or 
SUBJECTS WHO CHOSE ANSWER A, IN WHICH THEY EXPRESSED THE 
FEELING THAT THEY WOULD TRUST OTHERS Ir THEY rELT OTHERS 
TRUSTED THEM, AND ANSWERS 8 AND C WHICH INDICATED DEPENDENT 
OR COMPLETE NON-TRUSTING rEELINGS. 
TABLE S 
EXPRESSION OF TRUST OR PARTIAL AND NoN-
TRUST IN GENERAL. 
L 
TRUSTING 8 
















TH E CHI~ VALUE rOR THE DATA PRESENTED I N TABLE 8 WAS 
2 .740. THIS VALUE IS NOT SIGN IFICANT. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSS ION 
THE NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAME WAS USED IN THIS RESEARCH 
TO STUDY THE CHOICES MADE BY SUBJECTS IN THREE DEFINED GROUPS. 
THESE GROUPS WERE REFERRED TO AS GROUP N, (NORMALS-CONTROL 
GROUP), GROUP L (LEADERS AS DEFINED IN CHAPTER I I) AND GROUP 
A (SoclOPATHS AS DEFINED IN CHAPTER 11 ). 
Two HYPOTHESES WERE GENERATED CONCERNING PERFORMANCE 
OF SUBJECTS IN GAME BEHAVIOR: 1) THE EXPECTED PERFORMANCE OF 
SUBJECTS DEFINED AS LEADERS BY THEIR SOCIAL OR ACADEMIC 
POSITION WAS THAT THESE SUBJECTS WOULD MAKE MORE COOPERATIVE 
RESPONSES THEN THOSE NOT 50 DEFINED, AND 2) THAT THOSE SUB-
JECTS WHO ARE CURRENTLY FUNCTIONING WITH SOCIOPATHIC PERSON-
ALITY DISTURBANCES WOULD DISPLAY LESS COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR 
THEN THOSE SUBJECTS WHO HAD NO HISTORY OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
A FURTHER SUGGESTION WAS OFFERED TH f T THE SocrOPATHIC SUBJECT 
WOULD BE LESS TRUSTING AND MORE SUSPICIOUS THAN OTHER SUBJECTS 
OF HIS OPPONENT'S BEHAVIOR IN THE GAME PERFORMANCE. 
INSPECTION OF THE RESULTS REPORTED IN CHAPTER V DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS THAT LEADERS WOULD MAKE MORE CO0PERA-
TIVE CHOICES THEN THOSE NOT DEFINED AS LEADERS. IN FACT, AN 
INVERSE RELATIONSHIP WAS OBTAINED. THAT rs, LEADERS WERE 
SIGNIFICANTLY LESS COOPERATIVE THEN WERE NORMALS. IT IS OF 
INTEREST TO NOTE THAT THERE WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE CHOICES MADE BY EITHER THE 
LEADERS OR SoctOPATHS. 
IN CONSIDERATION Or THE RErERENCES AND OPINIO NS CITED 
IN CHAPTERS 1 AND 11, IT IS NOTED THAT Ir COOPERATIVENESS 
AND COMPETITIVENESS ARE CRUCIAL INGREDIENTS IN THE MORE 
COMPLEX BEHAVIOR CALLED TRUST AND SUSPICION, THEN THE PRO-
POSITION WAS SUGGESTED THAT DEVELOPMENTAL rACETS Or EGO-
INTEGRATION MIGHT WELL CONSTITUTE BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS DIS-
PLAYE D BY AN INDIVIDUAL IN A BARGAINING SITUATION. WHY THEN 
THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE OBSERVED BEHAVIOR Or LEADERS AND 
SOCIOPATHS IN THIS STUDY? 
THE rlRST CONSIDERATION Or THIS QUESTION CONCER NS THE 
CONTENT AND STRUCTURE Or EGO-DEVELOPMENT. As DEUTSCH (1960) 
CITES THAT THE DlrrERENCE INF SCALE SCORES DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
RErLECT STRUCTURAL DlrrERENCES IN PERSONALITY so MUCH AS CON-
TENT DlrrERENCES IN THE VALUES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS INTER-
NALIZED IN A DEVELOPMENT Or SOCIALIZATION SPEClrlC TO HIS OWN 
ENVIRONMENT, THE ERROR IN HYPOTHESIS 1 BECOMES SOMEWHAT MORE 
APPARENT. THE STRUCTURE Or THE EGO-P PO CESS MIGHT WELL BE 
ANALOGOUS IN THE LEADER AND THE SOCIOPATH, BUT IT IS IN THE 
CONTENT DlrrERENCES IN THE VALUES THAT HAVE BEEN INTERNALIZED 
BY SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND MORAL RESTRAINTS THAT THE TWO DlrrER. 
THE LEADER WILL DISPLAY COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR WITHIN HIS OWN 
GROUP BUT WHEN HE DEALS IN A BARGAINING SITUATIO N AS A rlGURE 
Or AUTHORITY WITH THE WELrARE Or HIS GROUP AT STAKE, THEN THE 
CONTENT Or THE VALUE CHANGES AND HIS BEHAVIOR IS CHANNELED 
IN A DlrrERENT AND MORE COMPETITIVE rRAME Or RErERENCE. 
PERTINENT TO THIS IS THE FACT THAT FIVE Or THE LEADERS INQUIRED 
AFTER THE EXPERIMENTAL SESSION IF THEY HAD BEEN COMPETING 
WITH OTHER FRATERNITY OR SORORITY OFFICERS. THEY REPORTED 
THAT THEY FELT THEY HAD, HENCE IF ONE IS FAMILIAR WITH THE 
COMPETITIVE SPIRIT USUALLY FOUND TO EXIST WITHIN FRATERNAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, THEN THE COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR OF THE LEADERS 
BECO MES MORE UNDERSTANDABLE. 
ONE MIGHT CONJECTURE THAT SIMILAR BEHAVIOR MIGHT BE 
OBSERVED IN LEADERS ON A MORE GROSS AND HIGHER LEVEL INVOLVED 
IN NATIONAL AND INTER-NATIONAL BARGAINING WHERE MORE OFTEN 
THAN NOT, MEETINGS, CONFERENCES AND CONVENTIONS RESULT IN 
STALE MATES. IF THE LEADER IS AWARE THAT HE IS DEALING WITH 
OTHERS IN LIKE POSITIONS OF POWER AND SIMULTANEOUSLY IS 
COGNIZANT OF THE INTEGRITY OF HIS OWN POSITION AND THE 
ENHANCEMENT OF THAT POSITION BY SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE, THEN 
ANY HARMFUL OR NON-BENEFICIAL CONCESSION TO THE OPPONENT WOULD 
IN TURN REFLECT HARMFUL OR NON-BENEFICIAL EFFECT UPON HIS 
OWN POSITION OR STATUS. IF AS HAS B~ EN PROPOSED EARLIER, 
EGO-INVOLVEMENT IS A CRUCIAL ASPECT OF THE BARGAINING SIT-
UATION, THEN THE BEHAVIOR OF LEADERS INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION OR BARGAINING AT STAKE, BUT ALSO 
THE CONTENT OF EGO-VALUES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL LEADER CARRIES 
WITHIN HIMSELF TO THE BARGAINING TABLE. 
A SECOND CONSIDERATION OF THE INITIAL QUESTION CON-
CERNS THE FUNCTION OF LIMITATIONS AND THE ROLE OF SUPEREGO IN 
RELATION TO INTERNALIZED VALUES. WHILE OF NECESSITY THE LEADER 
MUST DISPLAY SOME COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR, NAMELY MAINTENANCE OF 
STATUS AND POSITION AND ENHANCEMENT THEREOF, THE INTERNALIZED 
MORAL AND CULTURAL VALUES ARE YET CONTROLLED AND A DEFINITE 
SENSE OF WHAT IS ACCEPTABLY RIGHT OR WRONG IS MAINTAINED. 
FoR THE SOCIOPATH, THIS SENSE OF ACCEPTABLY RIGHT OR WRONG 
IS MOST PROBABLY INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF IMMEDIACY WITH 
LESS REFLECTION AND DELIBERATION THEN THE LEADER, AND WITH 
LESS RECOURSE TO ACCURATE INTERPRETATION AND JUDGMENT. THE 
DEGREE OF SUPER-EGO INFLUENCE UPON EGO FUNCTIONS APPEARS TO 
BE THE CRUX OF BEHAVIORAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO. FoR 
THE LEADER IT IMPOSES THE LIMITATION OF STAYING WITHIN THE 
LAW, FOR THE SOCIOPATH IT OFTEN DOES NOT. 
THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SoclOPATHIC SUBJECT WOULD 
MAKE LESS COOPERATIVE RESPONSES AND MORE COMPETITIVE RES-
PONSES THEN THE NORMAL SUBJECT WAS FULLY CONFIRMED. SIGNIFI-
CANCE WAS ATTAINED AT THE .05 LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. ONE MAY 
INFER GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN THAT ATTAINED IF THE CON-
SENSUS OF SEVERAL OF THE SOCIOPATHIC SUBJECTS COULD BE 
GENERALIZED TO THE WHOLE GROUP. HESE SUBJECTS REPORTE D TO 
STAFF ATTENDANTS THAT THEY WERE ONLY TRYING TO MAKE COOPER-
CHOICES IN THE COURSE OF THE GAME SO THEY COULD TAKE MORE 
MONEY AWAY FROM THE EXPERIMENTER AND ACT LIKE THEY WERE TRYING 
TO GET ALONG, BUT IF THE GAME WERE BEING PLAYED IN THEIR 
RESPECTIVE WARDS, WHERE THEY WERE CERTAIN THAT THEY WERE 
COMPETING WITH THEIR OWN GROUP, THEY 11 WOULD HAVE TAl<EN MORE 
RISKS TO GET MORE MONEY FOR THEMSELVES AND TO HELL WITH THE 
OTHER GUY. 11 
A SUMMARY OF COLEMAN'S (1956) DEFINITION OF SYMPTOMS 
CONCERNING THE SoclOPATHIC PERSONALITY PRESENTED EARLIER 
' 
AND THE ABOVE COMMENTS DEALING WITH CONTENT AND DEGREE OF 
LIMITATION IMPOSED UPON INTERNALIZED VALUES SEEM PERTINENT 
TO THE OBSERVED RESULTS. 
IN SURVEYING THE RESULTS OF TRUSTING AND NON-T RUSTING 
CHOICES IN TRIAL 8 , IT IS NOTED THAT THERE WAS A SIG NIFICA NT 
DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF TRUSTING CHOICES MADE BETWEEN 
THE NOR MALS AND THE SOCIOPATHS. THIS APPEARS TO BE IN COM-
PLETE AGREEMENT WITH OBSERVED GAME BEHAVIOR EOR BOTH GROUPS. 
THE NOR MAL SUBJECT MADE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE COOPERATIVE 
CHOICES THEN DID THE SOCIOPATH, AND WHEN TOLD TO MAKE THE 
FIRST CHOICE ON TRIAL $ , SHOWED GREATER PREFERENCE FOR THE 
BLACK (TRUSTING CHOICE). ON THE OTHER HAND, ON THE FIRST 
SEVEN TRIALS THE SOCIOPATH MADE MORE COMPETITIVE CHOICES 
THEN DID THE NOR MAL SUBJECT AND CONSEQUENTLY DISPLAYED SUS-
PICIOUS BEHAVIOR IN CHOOSING RED (NON-TRUSTING CHOICE) ON 
TRIAL 8 . ANALAGOUS TO THIS ARE COLEMAN'S DEFINITION OF SY MP-
TOMS STATED EARLIER CONCERNING THE SoclOPATH!C PERSONALITY 
AND THE ADMONITIONS OF STAFF MEMBERS AT THE STATE HOSPITAL 
TO THE EXPERIME NTE R BEFORE THE STU DY BEGA N ••• 11 BE CAREFUL OF 
WHAT YOU SAY TO THESE PEOPLE, THEY ARE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF 
EVERYONE WHO HAS ANY DEALINGS WITH THEM. 11 
IN' SEVERAL PREVIOUS STUDIES CITED, (DEUTSCH, 1958 ; 
PEDERSON, 1961) THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME DISAGREEMENT CONCERN-
ING THE EFFECT OF MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION PREVIOUS TO GAME 
PERFORMANCE. IN THIS STUDY, AN ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE 
SUBJECT TO CHOOSE COOPERATIVE RESPONSES BY VARYING INSTRUC-
TIONS DID NOT SEEM TO AFFECT THE GAME PERFORMANCE OF THE 
SUBJECT. THESE RESULTS TEND TO ADD SUPPORT TO PEDERSON 1 S 
STUDY IN WHICH ROLE PLAY PREVIOUS TO GAME PERFORMANCE HAD 
NO EFFECT ON NORMATIVE PERFORMANCE DURING THE GAME. 
TABLE 5 & 6). 
(SEE 
I N ASSE S SING THE RESULTS OF EXPRESSION OF FEELINGS 
FOR TRU S TING OR NOT TRUSTING THE OTHER PERSON AS PRESENTED 
IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT WHILE 
THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BET WEEN GROUPS IN EX-
PRESSION, THE LEADERS AND ABNOR MALS DID CHOOSE FEELINGS OF 
TRUST OR EXPRESSION OF FEELINGS FOR TRUST WHICH WAS NOT CO N-
SISTENT WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY PLAYED THE GAME. HERE 
AGAIN, THE EXISTENCE OF EGO-BOUND INTEGRITY SEEMS TO BE 
INFLUENTIAL. IN AN OBJECTIVE SITUATION WHERE IDENTIFICATION 
IS POSSIBLE, IT APPEARS THAT THE NEED FOR AN ACCEPTABLE 
11 1MAGE 11 IN THE EVES OF ANOTHER J c; OF IMPORTANCE. 
THE RESULTS OF THIS EXPERI MENT TEND TO CONFIR M SEVERAL 
NOTIONS AND AT LEAST ONE HYPOTHESIS: THE BEHAVIOR DISPLAY ED 
BY LEADERS, (As DEFINED IN THIS EXPERIMENT) AND SOCIOPATHS 
APPEAR TO BE SO MEWHAT ANALOGOUS BUT THAT THE CONTENT OF 
INTERNALIZED VALUES IN THE EGO-PROCESS DIFFERENTIATE AND GU I DE 
BEHAVIOR DIFFERENTLY FOR THE TWO GROUPS WITH THE FUNCTION OF 
LIMITATIONS AS A DISCRIMINATION FACTOR. SECONDLY, THE Soc10-
PATHIC PERSONALITY DISPLAYED MORE COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR THAN 
THE NORMAL SUBJECT IN THE GAME SITUATION, WHICH IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE THEORETICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS 
ATTRIBUTED TO THE SoclOPATHIC PERSONALITY AND IS POSITED 
TO BE A REFLECTION OF THE DIFFERENCES IN CONTENT VALUE THE 
INDIVIDUAL INCORPORATES INTO EGO-STRUCTURE THROUGH CULTURAL, 
SOCIAL AND MORAL INFLUENCES. 
THE SOCIOPATH DISPLAYED LESS TRUSTING BEHAVIOR THEN 
DID THE NORMAL SUBJECT IN THE GAME PLAYING SITUATION. AGAIN, 
THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EARLIER DESCRIPTIONS OF BEHAVIOR 
TYPICAL OF THE SOCIOPATH AND VERBAL DESCRIPTIONS BY TRAIN-
ED STAFF MEMBERS AT THE STATE HOSPITAL WHERE THESE PATIENTS 
ARE CONFINED. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
FORTY-EIGHT SUBJECTS PARTICIPATED IN AN EXPERIMENT 
UTILIZING THE NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAME. THREE GROUPS WERE 
STUDIED AND THEIR PEREORMANCE IN GAME PLAYING WAS RECORDED 
AND ANALYZED. GROUP L WAS COMPRISED OF 16 COLLEGE STUDENTS 
DEFINED AS LEADERS. GROUP N WAS COMPRISED OF 16 COLLEGE 
STUDENTS BUT WHO HELD NO POSITION OF LEADERSHIP OR AUTHORITY 
WITHIN THEIR SOCIAL OR ACADEMIC GROUP. THE THIRD GROUP, 
REFERRED TO AS GROUP A, WAS COMPRISED OF 16 PATIENTS FROM 
A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL AND WHO WERE DIAGNOZED AS SoCIOPATHIC 
PERSONALI TY DISORDER TYPES. 
THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS OFFERED TH AT SoclOPATHIC 
PERSONALITY TYPE WOULD DISPLAY MORE COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR THAN 
THOSE WHO HAD NO HISTORY OF MAL-ADJUSTED BEHAVtOR. RESULTS 
OF THIS STUDY TENDED TO CONFIRM AND S UPPORT THIS HYPOTHESIS. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 STATES THAT LEADERS WOULD DISPLAY MORE 
COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR THAN THOSE NOT SO CLASSIFIED. THE 
HYPOTHESIS WAS REJECTED AS AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP WAS OB-
TAINED IN WHICH THE GAME PERFORMANCE OF LEADERS DIFFERED 
SIGNIFICANTLY FKOM THE GAME PERFORMANCE OF NORMALS. FURTHER, 
LIKENESSES OF GAME BEHAVIOR WERE NOTED BETWEEN THE LEADERS 
AND THE SOCIOPATHS WHO DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE NORMAL 
GROUP IN BOTH NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE RESPONSES. 
A FURTHER ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOCIOPATH WOULD DISPLAY 
MORE SUSPICIOUS AND LESS TRUSTING BEHAVIOR THEN THE NORMAL 
WAS ALSO JUSTIFIED. THESE CONCLUSIONS TENDED TO CONCUR WITH 
EARLIER DEFINITIONS AND THEORETICAL NOTIONS. THE PROPOSAL 
WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE CONTENT VALUES INCORPORATED BY THE 
INDIVIDUAL EGO-PROCESS APPEARS TO INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR Or THE 
PARTICIPANT IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS. 
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AND YOU CHOOSE 
(BLACK) 
YOU GET 3f AND HE GETS 3~ 
AND YOU CHOOSE 
(RED) l 
YOU GET 5{ AND HE GETS 0? 
AND YOU CHOOSE 
(BLACK) 
YOU GET Q¢ AND HE GETS 5 f 
AND YOU CHOOSE 
(RED) 
YOU GET I~ AND HE GETS 11 
APPENDIX 2 
GENERAL PAYOFF MATRIX FOR NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAMES. 
PLAYER 2 
~ I B2 a, X1 ' X1 X2, X3 
PLAYER 1 
a.2 X3, X2 x4, X4 
x• I SUBJECT TO FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS. 
I ) 2x 1 )x2 + x3 ) 2X4• 
I I ) X3 > x1 
I I I ) X3 > X2 
IV) X4 > X2 
PAYOFF MA TRIX FOR NON-ZERO-SUM TYPE GAME 







5,0 1 , 1 
APPENDIX 3 
PLEASE CHECK THE ANSWER BELOW THAT M2..2.I. CLOSELY 
EXPRESSES YOUR FEELINGS. USE ONLY ONE ANSWER TO 
EACH QUESTION. 
(1.) AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GAME, DID YOU FEEL: 
A. You COULD TRUST YOUR OPPONENT TO CO-OPERATE WITH YOU. 
B. You COULD NOT TRUST YOUR OPPONENT AND FELT THAT HE 
WAS OUT TO MAKE ALL THE MONEY THAT HE COULD FOR HIM-
SELF AND DIDN 1 T CARE ABOUT YOUR FEELINGS. 
(2.) TOWARD THE filiQ. OF THE GAME, DID YOU FEEL THAT: 
A. You COULD TRUST YOUR OPPONENT TO CO-OPERATE so THAT 
BOTH OF YOU MIGHT MAKE MORE MONEY. 
B. You WERE SUSPICIOUS OF YOUR OPPONENT AND DIDN'T TRUST 
HIM AT ALL. 
(3.) .!l!. GENERAL, YOU FEEL THAT: 
A. You ARE THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO IS WILLING TO TRUST 
SOMEONE ELSE IF YOU FEEL LIKE THEY TRUST YOU. 
B. You ARE THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO IS WILLING TO TRUST 
SOMEONE ELSE ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE GIVEN YOU A GOOD 
REASON FOR TRUSTING THEM. 
c. You ARE THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO IS REALLY NEVER READY 
TO TRUST ANYONE BECAUSE YOU FEEL THAT THE NEXT GUY IS 
OUT TO GET YOU AND YOU MUST GET HIM FIRST IN ORDER TO 




L1 N1 A1 
No. CPR COR SEX TS CPR COR SEX T6 CPR COR SEX TS 
1. 4 2 M T 3 3 M T 4 0 M N 
2. 0 8 M T 0 8 F T 3 3 M N 
3. 2 4 F T 0 8 M T 4 M T 
4. 4 F T 3 3 F N 4 M T 
5. 4 4 M N 3 2 M T 4 M T 
6. 5 F N 0 8 M T 4 M N 
7. 5 0 M N 2 5 F T 4 2 M N 
8. 5 0 M N 2 5 M T 3 3 M N 
L2 N2 A2 
1. 5 0 M N 1 7 M T ·-y · 4 M T 
2. 2 4 F T 2 6 M T 3 3 M T 
3. 4 1 M T 2 4 F T 3 3 M T 
4. 5 0 F N 5 0 F N 4 0 M N 
5. 0 8 M T 7 M T 3 3 M N 
6. 2 6 F T 4 3 M N 4 M N 
7. 5 0 M N 4 F T 3 4 M N 
8. 2 5 M T 7 M T 4 M N 
GRAND MEDIAN COOPERATIVE 2RESPONSES: 2.875 
GRAND MEDIAN COMPETITIVE RESPONSES: 3.301 
KEY: CPR= COMPETITIVE RESPONSES 
COR= COOPERATIVE RESPONSES 
TS= CHOICE ON TRIAL g T=TRUSTING, N=NoN-TRUSTING. 
